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How banking regulation affects collusion sustainability: A multimarket contact approach

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  • Prekwinkel, Laura
  • Brito, Duarte
  • Vasconcelos, Helder

Abstract

This paper investigates how regulatory instruments affect collusion sustainability in banking within a theoretical framework where: (i) banks compete simultaneously in loan and deposit markets characterized by different degrees of product differentiation; (ii) strategic interaction occurs through an infinitely repeated game with Nash reversion strategies; and (iii) capital requirements, reserve ratios, and interbank rates alter the relative profitability of each market. We show that the impact of these instruments on collusion depends critically on relative market differentiation: the same regulatory instrument can either facilitate or hinder coordination depending on which market exhibits greater product homogeneity. This non-monotonicity implies that regulators must account for market structure when calibrating policy instruments to avoid unintended effects on competitive intensity.

Suggested Citation

  • Prekwinkel, Laura & Brito, Duarte & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2026. "How banking regulation affects collusion sustainability: A multimarket contact approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 265(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:265:y:2026:i:c:s0165176526001564
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112962
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    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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