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Efficient stable matching in school choice

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  • Iimura, Takuya
  • Isogaya, Ryuta

Abstract

We show, in the context of school choice, that when the lists of preferences and priority orderings are acyclic in the sense of Gutin et al. (2023), the outcomes of the deferred acceptance and top trading cycle algorithms coincide. This implies that the student-optimal stable matching is efficient. Furthermore, we show that if schools’ priority orderings of students are based on the sum of school-independent basic points and school-dependent additional points, and if students’ preferences align with these additional points, then the lists are acyclic. Additionally, if students can and do decline the addition of points that their preferences do not align with, then the lists become acyclic, regardless of the preference list.

Suggested Citation

  • Iimura, Takuya & Isogaya, Ryuta, 2025. "Efficient stable matching in school choice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 254(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:254:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525002599
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112422
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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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