IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolec/v244y2026ics0921800926000480.html

When scarcity intensifies conflict: On the role of asymmetry in common-pool resource games

Author

Listed:
  • Geschwind, Stephan
  • Lambsdorff, Johann Graf
  • Werner, Katharina

Abstract

Conflict over increasingly scarce resources such as freshwater, energy, arable land or wildlife has been identified as a major security threat in a world facing climate change. The literature suggests that asymmetric appropriation of resources facilitates such scarcity-related conflicts. We test this in a novel experimental design based on a dynamic common-pool resource game. In a 2x2 treatment design, we vary Asymmetry/Symmetry and Scarcity/Abundance. We induce Asymmetry by manipulating the perceived availability of the resource. Participants are nudged into high or low appropriations in the first round of the dynamic common-pool resource game. We implement Scarcity as environmental scarcity in the form of low reproduction rates of the renewable resource. Conflict is measured in a second stage of each round in a joy-of-destruction game. We find that environmental scarcity mitigates conflict under Symmetry, but not under Asymmetry. Our findings suggest that a world characterized by increasing scarcity might face exacerbated future conflicts if issues of asymmetric resource use are not properly addressed.

Suggested Citation

  • Geschwind, Stephan & Lambsdorff, Johann Graf & Werner, Katharina, 2026. "When scarcity intensifies conflict: On the role of asymmetry in common-pool resource games," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 244(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:244:y:2026:i:c:s0921800926000480
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2026.108963
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800926000480
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2026.108963?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:244:y:2026:i:c:s0921800926000480. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.