Author
Listed:
- Zhang, Lei
- Chen, Sisi
- Tong, Hangyan
- Qin, Quande
Abstract
Local governments worldwide increasingly emphasize their environmental governance performance (EGP) to demonstrate commitment to sustainability and inspire citizens' environmental engagement. While this strategy intuitively appears beneficial for promoting green behaviors, our study reveals an unexpected paradox that challenges this conventional wisdom. Drawing on the vicarious moral balancing framework, we examine how citizens' perception of government's EGP influences their green consumption behavior, with particular attention to the role of city identification. Through an experiment and a questionnaire survey, our findings demonstrate that: (1) When citizens perceive high levels of EGP, they tend to reduce their green consumption behaviors; conversely, when they perceive low levels of EGP, they increase such behavior. (2) This relationship is mediated by moral credit, suggesting that citizens might vicariously claim moral credits from government's environmental achievements. (3) The mediating effect of moral credit is moderated by city identification - the higher the city identification, the stronger the mediating effect. This study reveals an unexpected “too well” effect: while government's environmental achievements are crucial, they may inadvertently lead to moral licensing among citizens. We provide theoretical implications for vicarious moral balancing literature and practical suggestions for promoting citizens' green consumption behavior while maintaining government environmental initiatives.
Suggested Citation
Zhang, Lei & Chen, Sisi & Tong, Hangyan & Qin, Quande, 2026.
"When government does too well? Perceived environmental governance performance and citizens' green consumption,"
Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 241(C).
Handle:
RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:241:y:2026:i:c:s0921800925003507
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2025.108867
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