Valuing statistical absences? Why benefit-cost analysis cannot avoid population ethics

Policies subject to BCA sometimes prevent premature deaths. If survivors would later have children, those policies not only prevent deaths; they cause people who otherwise would have been absent from the population to come into being—i.e., they prevent “absences.” To date, BCA has grappled with the former effect, but scarcely the latter. We explore how BCA might respond to evidence that a policy causes or prevents absences. Importantly, we show that omitting absences is not neutral; it can be just as contestable as valuing them. Valuing “statistical absences” is most advisable when assessing policies that impact risks of massive mortality or human extinction (which could cause the absence of all future people) because of widely recognized obligations to future generations and because projecting absences is especially credible in this context. It is least advisable when it would impede autonomy, especially reproductive rights. In other cases, policies' impacts on absences may be too ambiguous to project credibly. If agencies can make credible absence projections, they may consider both valuing and omitting absences. If the analytical outcome changes, they should consider the relevant policy context. Finally, we explore how to value absences, explaining differences from the value of a statistical life.