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Promotion incentives and participatory governance in China: Evidence from TV policy inquiry

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  • Wang, Meng
  • Zhao, Xiaoqing

Abstract

This study explains the emergence of TV policy inquiry in China from the perspective of promotion incentives. We construct a mathematical model to demonstrate that TV policy inquiry stems from the utility-maximizing decisions of local officials driven by promotion incentives. Building on this, we employ a panel dataset of 290 cities from 2012 to 2022 to construct a regression model for empirical analysis. The benchmark regressions reveal that party secretary promotion incentives lead to a 22% increase in TV policy inquiry, whereas the impact of mayor promotion incentives is statistically insignificant. The causal relationship revealed by the benchmark regressions remains robust across a series of subsequent endogeneity discussions and robustness checks. Further analysis confirms that TV policy inquiry yields effective governance outcomes, evidenced by an increased supply of livelihood-related public goods and a mitigated risk of governance crises. This study contributes to the understanding of why authoritarian states introduce participatory governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Meng & Zhao, Xiaoqing, 2026. "Promotion incentives and participatory governance in China: Evidence from TV policy inquiry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:161:y:2026:i:c:s0264999326001665
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2026.107637
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy

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