IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecmode/v156y2026ics0264999326000064.html

Rule-based profit taxation in dynamic Cournot oligopoly: Transmission, stability and welfare

Author

Listed:
  • Nálepová, Veronika
  • Lampart, Marek

Abstract

This study develops a dynamic Cournot model to examine whether profit taxation can stabilise oligopolistic markets hit by demand shocks. The tax rate is updated each period by a simple welfare rule, allowing fiscal policy to respond automatically to changing market conditions. The analysis connects the effectiveness with which taxes influence firms’ decision-making (the transmission strength) to market stability. Simulations and chaos analysis show that when the tax signal is strong, firms adjust smoothly, volatility falls and competition is preserved. In contrast, when transmission is weak, feedback effects magnify shocks, increasing exit risk and market concentration. Moderate shocks are absorbed through temporary tax changes, while stronger demand shocks in the model mainly threaten the high-cost firm. Overall, transparent and predictable profit taxation serves as a practical stabiliser in concentrated industries, limiting volatility without ad hoc measures and providing a scalable framework for future fiscal design.

Suggested Citation

  • Nálepová, Veronika & Lampart, Marek, 2026. "Rule-based profit taxation in dynamic Cournot oligopoly: Transmission, stability and welfare," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:156:y:2026:i:c:s0264999326000064
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2026.107477
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999326000064
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econmod.2026.107477?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:156:y:2026:i:c:s0264999326000064. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30411 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.