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Optimal investment and financing with government subsidies under time to build

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  • Xia, Xin
  • Hu, Shaoyong
  • Gan, Liu

Abstract

This paper develops a real-options model that incorporates the game-theoretic interaction between firms and the government. We examine how government subsidies influence a firm’s optimal investment and financing decisions when accounting for time-to-build delays. Our findings indicate that subsidies induce leveraged firms to accelerate investment, albeit with a smaller investment scale and more conservative debt financing. Additionally, despite receiving fewer subsidies, leveraged firms tend to invest both earlier and at a larger scale than unleveraged firms. Furthermore, as subsidies become more effective at reducing time to build, investment is accelerated, leverage declines, and the optimal investment scale exhibits a U-shaped pattern. Lastly, compared to non-negotiated debt, the effect of negotiated-debt financing on optimal subsidies and investment scale depends on shareholders’ bargaining power. Our model offers novel and practical insights for policymakers designing effective subsidy programs and for managers formulating sound business strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Xia, Xin & Hu, Shaoyong & Gan, Liu, 2025. "Optimal investment and financing with government subsidies under time to build," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:152:y:2025:i:c:s0264999325002275
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107232
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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