Politically connected independent directors and the gap between carbon disclosure and emission reductions

Carbon disclosure is meant to inform stakeholders about firms' emissions and climate commitments, yet disclosed information often diverges from actual mitigation efforts. This study investigates how politically connected independent directors shape carbon disclosure catering—the misalignment between what firms report about emission reductions and what they actually achieve. Drawing on 11,436 firm-year observations from 2640 Chinese A-share listed firms over 2014–2020, we construct a catering index that pairs text-based measures of low-carbon language in annual reports with firm-level carbon emission data. We find that a higher proportion of politically connected independent directors is significantly associated with greater carbon disclosure catering. Instrumental variable estimation using a leave-one-out measure of city-level political connection prevalence, together with a battery of robustness checks, corroborates the baseline findings. Mechanism tests reveal two reinforcing channels: political ties bolster reputation management and reduce environmental penalties, inclining firms toward symbolic disclosure; they also suppress environmental investment without strengthening social responsibility awareness, constraining genuine emission reductions. Heterogeneity analyses further indicate that these effects intensify in high-emission industries, among directors with senior political backgrounds, during local government leadership turnover, and under heightened media scrutiny. The findings underscore how politically connected directors can widen the gap between corporate rhetoric and action on carbon management, with implications for the design and enforcement of carbon disclosure regimes.