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Inattentive Citizens: Impact of elections on political interest across 93 countries

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  • Go, Laurence

Abstract

Democracy, now more than ever, requires constant vigilance and active citizen engagement. Understanding whether, when, and why individuals pay attention to politics is therefore essential to the health of democracy worldwide. Using global survey data with over one million observations, I find that attention to politics is 10% higher after elections. However, this surge is short-lived, returning to pre-election levels after 10 days. There is no discernible pre-trend, with political attention remaining stable prior to the election. Political interest is higher in elections where the first round is decisive, when an incumbent loses, and when economic policy is more uncertain. Following elections, citizens consume news and discuss politics more frequently. Evidence supports a model of costly information acquisition where citizens are significantly more attentive to politics and acquire information post-election. Campaigns and respondent selection are unlikely to account for the results. The findings underscore how the cost of attention can limit sustained political engagement, with far-reaching implications for political accountability and democratic institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Go, Laurence, 2026. "Inattentive Citizens: Impact of elections on political interest across 93 countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:181:y:2026:i:c:s0304387826000374
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2026.103754
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General

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