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The distribution game: Evidence from 200,000 campaign donors

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  • Melo, Caíque

Abstract

This paper examines how reduced individual influence leads politicians to use public-sector employment as a compensatory instrument. Identification exploits a Brazilian reform imposing population-based ceilings on municipal council size, generating quasi-experimental variation in political leverage. I combine electoral records for city councilors, campaign donation data on roughly 200,000 individuals, and matched administrative labor-market records. Reduced influence raises the likelihood that campaign supporters obtain public-sector jobs by about 26%. These gains concentrate in managerial and supervisory positions, include upward reallocation of already employed insiders, and are associated with lower education and greater skill and pay mismatch. The results show that public employment operates as a personnel-based distributive instrument, through which politicians offset diminished influence, with consequences for bureaucratic quality and governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Melo, Caíque, 2026. "The distribution game: Evidence from 200,000 campaign donors," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:181:y:2026:i:c:s0304387826000325
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2026.103749
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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I25 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Economic Development

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