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Unemployment insurance with moral hazard in a dynamic economy A comment

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  • Hopenhayn, Hugo A.

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  • Hopenhayn, Hugo A., 1996. "Unemployment insurance with moral hazard in a dynamic economy A comment," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 43-46, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:crcspp:v:44:y:1996:i::p:43-46
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Stephen E. Spear & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617.
    7. Jan Boone & Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund & Jan C. van Ours, 2007. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 399-421, March.
    8. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
    9. Davidson, Carl & Woodbury, Stephen A., 1997. "Optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 359-387.
    10. Laun, Tobias, 2012. "Optimal Social Insurance with Endogenous Health," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 742, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 26 Mar 2013.
    11. James Albrecht & Susan Vroman, 2005. "Equilibrium Search With Time-Varying Unemployment Benefits," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 631-648, July.
    12. Shavell, Steven & Weiss, Laurence, 1979. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 1347-1362.
    13. Alice Fabre & Stéphane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 2014. "Universal Basic Income versus Unemployment Insurance," Cahiers de recherche 1427, CIRPEE.
    14. Dale T. Mortensen, 1977. "Unemployment Insurance and Job Search Decisions," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 30(4), pages 505-517, July.
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    16. Abowd, John M & Zellner, Arnold, 1985. "Estimating Gross Labor-Force Flows," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 3(3), pages 254-283, June.
    17. Hansen, Gary D & Imrohoroglu, Ayse, 1992. "The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 118-142.
    18. Christopher Phelan, 1994. "Incentives and Aggregate Shocks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 681-700.
    19. Cheng Wang, 1995. "Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 577-595.
    20. Andrew Atkeson & Robert E. Lucas, 1992. "On Efficient Distribution With Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 427-453.
    21. Fernando Álvarez-Parra & Juan M. Sanchez, 2009. "Unemployment insurance with a hidden labor market," Working Paper 09-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    22. Topel, Robert H, 1984. "Experience Rating of Unemployment Insurance and the Incidence of Unemployment," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 61-90, April.
    23. Oliver Jean Blanchard & Peter Diamond, 1990. "The Cyclical Behovior of the Gross Flows of U.S. Workers," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(2), pages 85-156.
    24. Carlos E. da Costa & Lucas Maestri, 2005. "The Interaction Between Unemployment Insurance And Human Capital Policies," Anais do XXXIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 33th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 089, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    25. Davidson, Carl & Woodbury, Stephen A., 1997. "Optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 359-387.
    26. Álvarez-Parra, Fernando & Sánchez, Juan M., 2009. "Unemployment insurance with a hidden labor market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(7), pages 954-967, October.
    27. Narayana Kocherlakota, 1993. "Efficient Bilateral Risk Sharing Without Commitment," Macroeconomics 9311001, EconWPA.
    28. Reichling, Felix, 2006. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Labor Market Equilibrium when Workers can Self-Insure," MPRA Paper 5362, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Oct 2007.
    29. Mele, Antonio, 2014. "Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 69-85.
    30. Hopenhayn, Hugo A & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 412-438, April.
    31. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    32. Bart Taub, 1990. "The Equivalence of Lending Equilibria and Signalling-Based Insurance under Asymmetric Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 388-408.
    33. Mortensen, Dale T., 1983. "A welfare analysis of unemployment insurance: Variations on second-best themes," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, pages 67-97.
    34. Andrew Atkeson & Robert E. Lucas, Jr., 1993. "Effciency and Equality in a Simple Model of Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 4381, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    35. David Bardey & Samir Kiuhan & Julio César Suárez, 2009. "Seguros de desempleo: revisión de literatura y propuesta para Colombia," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 005739, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tsuyuhara, Kunio, 2016. "The adverse effect of unemployment insurance on workers’ on-the-job effort and labor market outcomes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 83-85.

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