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Does common ownership raise antitrust concerns?

Author

Listed:
  • Li, Huaizhou
  • Liu, Leo
  • Masulis, Ronald
  • Zein, Jason

Abstract

Common ownership has raised growing antitrust concerns. We compile a comprehensive dataset of U.S. antitrust litigation cases from the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Justice, and consumer-initiated lawsuits to shed light on these concerns. We find no robust relationship between common ownership of firm-pairs and the likelihood of these firms being jointly sued. Furthermore, common ownership is negatively associated with potential channels of collusion, such as interlocking directors and competitor-benchmarked executive pay. Evidence from institutional mergers and S&P 500 additions of rival firms supports our main conclusions. Overall, our results offer little support for the view that common ownership promotes explicit collusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Huaizhou & Liu, Leo & Masulis, Ronald & Zein, Jason, 2026. "Does common ownership raise antitrust concerns?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:100:y:2026:i:c:s0929119926000957
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103037
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    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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