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CEOs, parenthood, and corporate misconduct

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  • Donker, Han
  • Nofsinger, John
  • Shank, Corey A.

Abstract

This study examines whether CEOs’ personal experiences as parents influence corporate ethical behavior. Drawing on the female socialization hypothesis, we test whether the gender of a CEO’s children, particularly the firstborn, affects the likelihood and severity of corporate misconduct, measured through U.S. Department of Justice regulatory violations. Using a large panel of U.S. firms, we find that companies led by CEOs with daughters commit fewer regulatory violations and pay smaller fines, with the effect concentrated among those whose firstborn child is a daughter. Additional analyses show that the number of daughters further reduces misconduct, suggesting cumulative exposure reinforces ethical awareness. Overall, our results highlight how early and repeated exposure to daughters can shape executives’ moral and risk preferences, ultimately influencing corporate decision-making and reducing unethical behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Donker, Han & Nofsinger, John & Shank, Corey A., 2025. "CEOs, parenthood, and corporate misconduct," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:beexfi:v:48:y:2025:i:c:s2214635025001042
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2025.101123
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