Optimal pricing incentive strategy based on Stackelberg game for EVs and HFCVs in low-carbon integrated energy system

Carbon neutrality policies are driving the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (HFCVs). Nevertheless, large-scale uncoordinated charging and refueling increase carbon emissions and operational costs within a low-carbon integrated energy system (IES). To fill this gap, this study proposes a Stackelberg game-based pricing incentive strategy to coordinate the energy supply side, traditional load, and vehicle aggregator. First, a traffic-grid coupling model links charging stations and hydrogen refueling stations to capture the spatiotemporal demand distribution of EVs and HFCVs. The uncoordinated energy consumption of vehicles is forecast using a dynamic traffic network, tire energy consumption, and an air-conditioning model. Besides, a user-satisfaction-oriented charging and vehicle-to-grid model is further constructed to optimize orderly charging, refueling, and discharging load allocation. On this basis, a Stackelberg game with one leader and multiple followers is formulated, incorporating a stepped carbon trading mechanism to achieve coordinated low-carbon and economic scheduling. Simulation results indicate that the proposed approach significantly improves environmental and economic performance across five scenarios. Compared with a non-cooperative benchmark, the proposed strategy reduces IES carbon emissions by 5.57%, lowers costs for the load aggregator and vehicle aggregator by 27.34% and 13.19%, respectively, and increases energy supplier profit by 144.88%. These findings demonstrate that the proposed pricing mechanism effectively balances carbon reduction and economic performance in low-carbon IES operation.