IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/appene/v412y2026ics0306261926003715.html

Blockchain and double auction for credible and efficient voluntary carbon market

Author

Listed:
  • Liu, Xinlai
  • Bagchi, Tolkien
  • Rachana Harish, Arjun
  • Sy, Charlle Lee
  • Gao, H. Oliver

Abstract

The voluntary carbon market (VCM) is a crucial mechanism for facilitating the renewable energy transition and global climate goals. However, the credibility and efficiency of this market-based mechanism are constrained by several challenges, including transparency issues, credit double-counting, and inefficient pricing. This study proposes a blockchain-enabled VCM that uses tokenization and a double auction for climate governance. First, blockchain is used to enhance transparency by maintaining an immutable ledger that records all carbon credit transactions. Second, tokenization reduces double-counting across stakeholders by digitizing carbon credits with unique identifiers. Third, the double auction mechanism, implemented via smart contracts, enables efficient market clearing by automatically matching buyers' bids and sellers' asks at fair prices. We validate the system in three dynamic energy-relevant scenarios: (1) Poisson-based arrivals of credit buyers' demands and sellers' supply in the energy sector, (2) seasonal credit demand variation for energy stakeholders, and (3) a large-scale application driven by U.S. 3144 counties' transportation emissions, a sector tightly coupled to fossil fuel consumption. Results show that the proposed blockchain–auction solution achieves stable and efficient market clearing across all three energy-relevant scenarios. Performance benchmarking further confirms low latency and stable throughput, indicating the practicality of deploying the mechanism for real-world applications. Together, blockchain transparency, unique tokenization, and double auction pricing deliver a credible and efficient VCM.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Xinlai & Bagchi, Tolkien & Rachana Harish, Arjun & Sy, Charlle Lee & Gao, H. Oliver, 2026. "Blockchain and double auction for credible and efficient voluntary carbon market," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 412(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:appene:v:412:y:2026:i:c:s0306261926003715
    DOI: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2026.127719
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306261926003715
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.apenergy.2026.127719?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:appene:v:412:y:2026:i:c:s0306261926003715. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/405891/description#description .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.