IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/appene/v402y2025ipas0306261925014977.html

An improved cross-carrier MED model for integrated electricity and natural gas systems: Economics, transparency, and privacy

Author

Listed:
  • Niu, Man
  • Gao, Ciwei
  • Diaz-Cachinero, Pablo
  • Muñoz-Delgado, Gregorio
  • Contreras, Javier

Abstract

The cross-carrier multilateral economic dispatch (MED) are promising in the aspect of addressing the increasing demand for consumer choice, greater trading flexibility and data privacy. This paper aims to resolve the existed issues in modeling the MED problem for integrated electricity and gas systems, such as insufficient energy allocation, unspecified price orientation, potential trading data disclosure and opaque payment calculation. The modeling improvements are progressively enhanced from MED models I through III mainly by removing loss allocation policies, simplifying variables and rearranging coupling variables among subsystems. The price links between the original and adjusted models, as well as price links between the centralized and decentralized models are analyzed to achieve equivalent transaction prices. In view of the decentralized implementation, sharing and payment information is kept to be consistent to ensure the transparent payment calculation between every pair of subsystems, enhancing payment security. Privacy performance is improved in two aspects: Trading data unavailable to the third party and minimum information set shared among subsystems. Numerical results show that the performances of the new MED models improve social welfare (SW), trading data privacy and solving time. The new P2P transaction prices are demonstrated to be beneficial to dispatched suppliers with product differentiation advantages in market orientation.

Suggested Citation

  • Niu, Man & Gao, Ciwei & Diaz-Cachinero, Pablo & Muñoz-Delgado, Gregorio & Contreras, Javier, 2025. "An improved cross-carrier MED model for integrated electricity and natural gas systems: Economics, transparency, and privacy," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 402(PA).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:appene:v:402:y:2025:i:pa:s0306261925014977
    DOI: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2025.126767
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306261925014977
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.apenergy.2025.126767?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    2. Jia, Hongjie & Wang, Xiaoyu & Jin, Xiaolong & Cheng, Lin & Mu, Yunfei & Yu, Xiaodan & Wei, Wei, 2024. "Optimal pricing of integrated community energy system for building prosumers with P2P multi-energy trading," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 365(C).
    3. Ge, Shaoyun & Li, Jifeng & He, Xingtang & Liu, Hong, 2021. "Joint energy market design for local integrated energy system service procurement considering demand flexibility," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 297(C).
    4. Niu, Man & Gao, Ciwei & Muñoz-Delgado, Gregorio & Contreras, Javier, 2024. "A cross-carrier multilateral trading model for integrated electricity and natural gas systems," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 354(PB).
    5. Wang, Ni & Liu, Ziyi & Heijnen, Petra & Warnier, Martijn, 2022. "A peer-to-peer market mechanism incorporating multi-energy coupling and cooperative behaviors," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 311(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wu, Biao & Zhang, Shaohua & Yuan, Chenxin & Wang, Xian & Wang, Fei & Zhang, Shengqi, 2024. "Cooperative energy and reserve trading strategies for multiple integrated energy systems based on asymmetric nash bargaining theory," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 313(C).
    2. Wright, Austin L. & Sonin, Konstantin & Driscoll, Jesse & Wilson, Jarnickae, 2020. "Poverty and economic dislocation reduce compliance with COVID-19 shelter-in-place protocols," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 544-554.
    3. Janvier D. Nkurunziza, 2005. "Reputation and Credit without Collateral in Africa`s Formal Banking," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2005-02, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Vadim Borokhov, 2014. "On the properties of nodal price response matrix in electricity markets," Papers 1404.3678, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2015.
    5. Gan, Li & Ju, Gaosheng & Zhu, Xi, 2015. "Nonparametric estimation of structural labor supply and exact welfare change under nonconvex piecewise-linear budget sets," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 188(2), pages 526-544.
    6. Peterson, Jeffrey M. & Boisvert, Richard N. & de Gorter, Harry, 1999. "Multifunctionality and Optimal Environmental Policies for Agriculture in an Open Economy," Working Papers 127701, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    7. Aldasoro, Iñaki & Delli Gatti, Domenico & Faia, Ester, 2017. "Bank networks: Contagion, systemic risk and prudential policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 164-188.
    8. Gatti, Nicolas & Cecil, Michael & Baylis, Kathy & Estes, Lyndon & Blekking, Jordan & Heckelei, Thomas & Vergopolan, Noemi & Evans, Tom, 2023. "Is closing the agricultural yield gap a “risky” endeavor?," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    9. Chorvat, Terrence, 2006. "Taxing utility," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 1-16, February.
    10. Bhattacharya, D., 2018. "Income Effects and Rationalizability in Multinomial Choice Models," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1884, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    11. Che-Yuan Liang, 2017. "Optimal inequality behind the veil of ignorance," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(3), pages 431-455, October.
    12. Christopher Blier-Wong & Jean-Gabriel Lauzier, 2026. "Designing entry-monotone risk-sharing pools," Papers 2606.00972, arXiv.org.
    13. Shino, Junnosuke, 2013. "A positive theory of fixed-rate funds-supplying operations in an accommodative financial environment," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 595-610.
    14. Peysakhovich, Alexander & Plagborg-Møller, Mikkel, 2012. "A note on proper scoring rules and risk aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 357-361.
    15. Badics, Tamás, 2011. "Az arbitrázs preferenciákkal történő karakterizációjáról [On the characterization of arbitrage in terms of preferences]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 727-742.
    16. Peters, Glen, 2008. "Reassessing Carbon Leakage," Conference papers 331753, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    17. Vizard, Polly, 2005. "The contributions of Professor Amartya Sen in the field of human rights," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 6273, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    18. Amir, Rabah & Bloch, Francis, 2009. "Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 7-24, January.
    19. Giuseppe De Marco & Jacqueline Morgan, 2008. "Friendliness And Reciprocity In Equilibrium Selection," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(01), pages 53-72.
    20. Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2016. "Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(2), pages 115-143, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:appene:v:402:y:2025:i:pa:s0306261925014977. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/405891/description#description .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.