Risk Invariance and Ordinally Additive Utility Functions
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
- David M. Grether & Charles R. Plott, 1982. "Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 143-149.
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996.
"A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997.
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Social choice," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 31, pages 1091-1125 Elsevier.
- Hong, Lu, 1998. "Feasible Bayesian Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 201-221, June.
- Amartya K. Sen, 1971. "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 307-317.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015.
"Axioms of invariance for TU-games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 891-902, November.
- Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2012. "Axioms of Invariance for TU-games," Working Papers 2012-01, CRESE.
- Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "Axioms of invariance for TU-games," MPRA Paper 41530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015. "Axioms of Invariance for TU-games," Post-Print halshs-01096552, HAL.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:45:y:1977:i:3:p:621-40. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.