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Rational Expectations and Bond Pricing: Modelling the Term Structure with and without Certainty Equivalence

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  • Begg, David K H

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  • Begg, David K H, 1984. "Rational Expectations and Bond Pricing: Modelling the Term Structure with and without Certainty Equivalence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 45-58, Supplemen.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:94:y:1984:i:376a:p:45-58
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Okada, Akira, 1996. "A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-108, September.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    3. Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-1095, December.
    4. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:cup:apsrev:v:85:y:1991:i:01:p:137-164_17 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2005. "Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 278-311, February.
    7. William Neilson, 2006. "Axiomatic reference-dependence in behavior toward others and toward risk," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(3), pages 681-692, August.
    8. Richard D. Mckelvey & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Seniority in Legislature," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 12, pages 185-199 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Montero, Maria, 2006. "Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 380-397, February.
    10. Kalandrakis, Anastassios, 2004. "A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 294-322, June.
    11. John Kagel & Katherine Wolfe, 2001. "Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(3), pages 203-219, December.
    12. Fr Chette, Guillaume R. & Kagel, John H. & Lehrer, Steven F., 2003. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, pages 221-232.
    13. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 1998. "Strategy and Equity: An ERC Analysis of the Guth-van Damme Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2060, David K. Levine.
    14. Banks, Jeffrey s. & Duggan, John, 2000. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(01), pages 73-88, March.
    15. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1990. "The Role of Risk Preferences in Bargaining When Acceptance of a Proposal Requires Less than Unanimous Approval," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 135-154, June.
    16. Frechette, Guillaume & Kagel, John H. & Morelli, Massimo, 2005. "Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1497-1517, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shiller, Robert J. & Huston McCulloch, J., 1990. "The term structure of interest rates," Handbook of Monetary Economics,in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 13, pages 627-722 Elsevier.
    2. Peel, David & Davidson, James, 1998. "A non-linear error correction mechanism based on the bilinear model1," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 165-170, February.
    3. Chappell, David & Peel, David A., 1998. "A note on some properties of the ESTAR model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 311-315, September.
    4. Alho, Kari, . "Analysis of Financial Markets and Central Bank Policy in the Flow-of-Funds Framework. An Application to the Case of Finland," ETLA A, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, number 12.

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