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Intergroup Conflict with Intragroup Altruism

Author

Listed:
  • Wei Hu

    (ETH-Zürich, Switzerland)

  • Nicolas Treich

    (Toulouse School of Economics, INRA)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider an intergroup contest game with intragroup altruism. We show that more altruism within a group increases conflict intensity by increasing total groups' efforts. Moreover, we show that, unlike the celebrated Olson's group size paradox, group size increases the probability of winning the contest provided that intragroup altruism is high enough.

Suggested Citation

  • Wei Hu & Nicolas Treich, 2018. "Intergroup Conflict with Intragroup Altruism," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(2), pages 720-724.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00011
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2018/Volume38/EB-18-V38-I2-P71.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2012. "The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 68-82.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Altruism; Contest; Conflict; Group size paradox.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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