We develop a model of retail competition and negotiations with an upstream supplier for several firms of different sizes. Contrary to existing thinking, we demonstrate that the larger a buyer the less countervailing power he possesses over the supplier. The reason for this is that a buyer's outside option - the ability to integrate backwards - becomes proportionately weaker as he grows in size as self-production is characterised by diseconomies of scale.
Volume (Year): 31 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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