Coordinating choice in partial cooperative equilibrium
In this paper we consider symmetric aggregative games and investigate partial cooperation between a portion of the players that sign a cooperative agreement and the rest of the players. Existence results of partial cooperative equilibria are obtained when the players who do not sign the agreement play a Nash equilibrium game having multiple solutions. Some applications in the supermodular case are discussed.
Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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