Spatial Cournot competition and timing of endogenous wage setting
This paper studies the problem of location-quantity choice in a duopoly in which the wage paid by each firm is set by the corresponding monopoly union. Compared with the outcome obtained in location-price choice game, we find that the wage setting choice for both unions does not change in our model, they still choose to set wage sequentially. The equilibrium locations are not influenced by the timing of wage setting.
Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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