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Die deutsche Hyperinflation 1923 – was können wir heute davon lernen?

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Heine
  • Hansjörg Herr

Abstract

The combination of high, partly foreign debt and a politically unstable situation made it impossible for the young Weimar Republic to reduce the budget deficits and national debt, which were already high at the end of World War I. As attempts to stabilize the exchange rate and confidence in the mark collapsed, a cumulative devaluation-wage-price-devaluation spiral developed, leading to the total breakdown of the monetary system in 1923. Capital flight and devaluation were fed by escalating budget deficits financed through the central bank and large loans to the corporate sector, which the central bank refinanced as lender of last resort. The analysis of the German hyperinflation in 1923 shows that even today developed countries can enter periods of high inflation or even hyperinflation. In this context, the sharp rise in private and government debt relative to GDP in recent decades is a cause for concern. This increases the fragility of the economic system and makes hyperinflations possible even today in the event of political turbulence. The German hyperinflation also shows the weakness of the Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). Eine Kombination von hohen in- und ausländischen Schulden und einer politisch instabilen Situation verunmöglichten es der jungen Weimarer Republik die schon am Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges hohen Budgetdefizite und Staatsschulden zu reduzieren. Als Versuche misslangen, den Wechselkurs zu stabilisieren und das Vertrauen in die Mark zusammenbrach, entwickelte sich eine kumulative Abwertungs-Lohn-Preis-Abwertungs-Spirale, die 1923 zum gänzlichen Zusammenbruch des Geldsystems führte. Gespeist wurden Kapitalflucht und Abwertung durch eskalierende über die Zentralbank finanzierte Budgetdefizite und hohe Kredite an den Unternehmenssektor, welche die Zentralbank als Lender of Last Resort refinanzierte. Die Analyse der deutschen Hyperinflation 1923 zeigt, dass auch heute selbst entwickelte Länder in Perioden hoher Inflation oder gar in eine Hyperinflation geraten können. Beunruhigend sind in diesem Zusammenhang die in den letzten Jahrzehnten stark angestiegenen öffentlichen und privaten Schulden im Verhältnis zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt, welche die Fragilität des ökonomischen Systems erhöhen und bei entsprechenden politischen Turbulenzen Hyperinflationen grundsätzlich möglich machen. Die deutsche Hyperinflation zeigt auch Schwachstellen der Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) auf.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Heine & Hansjörg Herr, 2023. "Die deutsche Hyperinflation 1923 – was können wir heute davon lernen?," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 92(2), pages 115-132.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:92-2-8
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.92.2.115
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hyperinflation; Inflation; Geldpolitik; Abwertung; Lohn-Preis-Spirale;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • N14 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: 1913-

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