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Vertikale fiskalische Externalitäten und Kofinanzierung in der Regionalpolitik der Europäischen Union

Listed author(s):
  • Matthias Wrede

The regional and cohesion policy of the European union redistributes among regions and countries. Regional investment in (public) infrastructure is supported with matching grants. This article asks why matching grants instead of unconditional grants are used. It analyzes to which extent vertical fiscal externalities can justify the choice of instrument. The paper shows that the high EUmatching- grant rate cannot be explained by vertical fiscal externalities. Die Regional-, Struktur- und Kohäsionspolitik dient der Umverteilung von Ressourcen zwischen Regionen und Ländern. Die Europäische Union unterstützt dabei mit gebundenen Zuweisungen regionale (öffentliche) Infrastrukturinvestitionen. Dieser Beitrag geht der Frage nach, warum zur Umverteilung keine ungebundenen Zuweisungen eingesetzt werden, und prüft, ob und inwieweit vertikale fiskalische Externalitäten das Kofinanzierungsprinzip rechtfertigen und erklären können. Es zeigt sich, dass die hohe EU-Kofinanzierungsrate durch vertikale fiskalische Externalitäten nicht gerechtfertigt werden kann.

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Article provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its journal Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung.

Volume (Year): 74 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 66-73

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Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:74-1-5
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