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Modes de gouvernance et performances des entreprises familiales françaises en fonction des conflits d’agence - Modes of Organization and Performances of French families firms according to the agency conflicts


  • Patrice Charlier

    () (EM Strasbourg - Université de Strasbourg Large (EA 2364))

  • Gilles Lambert

    () (EM Strasbourg - Université de Strasbourg BETA UMR CNRS 7522)


(VF)Les développements récents de la théorie des entreprises familiales amènent à distinguer les entreprises à contrôle familial - majoritaire ou minoritaire - et à direction familiale ou non familiale. Dans ce nouveau cadre d’analyse, les entreprises familiales présentent deux composantes du conflit d’agence : le conflit classique actionnaire-dirigeant - conflit de type I - et le conflit entre actionnaires majoritaires et minoritaires - conflit de type II -. L’objet de cette étude est de tester ces nouvelles approches nées dans un contexte institutionnel américain sur un échantillon d’entreprises familiales françaises non cotées où des différences institutionnelles sont notables, notamment en termes de régime de protection des actionnaires, de pratiques de divulgation d’informations financières, ou encore de degré d’ouverture du CA à des administrateurs indépendants. Nos résultats montrent des performances différentes pour les entreprises familiales négativement corrélées aux conflits d’agence conformément aux grandes sociétés familiales américaines cotées.(VA)The recent developments of the theory of the family firms bring to distinguish firms with family control - member of the majority party or member of a minority party - and in family or not family management. In this new frame of analysis, the family firms present two constituents of the conflict of agency: the conflict classic shareholder-leader - conflict of type I - and the conflict between majority and minority shareholders - conflict of type II-. The object of this communication is to test these new approaches for the first time on a sample of private French family firms where the legal rules covering protection of shareholders, disclosure practices, or proportion of independent members in the board of directors differ. Even if the separation between control and management is source of conflict of agency, our results show that the most successful firms are the ones which have the most weakest conflict of agency.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrice Charlier & Gilles Lambert, 2013. "Modes de gouvernance et performances des entreprises familiales françaises en fonction des conflits d’agence - Modes of Organization and Performances of French families firms according to the agency c," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie,, vol. 16(2), pages 1-26, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:16:y:2013:i:2:p:1-26.

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    More about this item


    entreprise familiale; conflit d’agence; actionnaire majoritaire; dirigeant familial; performance; family firm; conflict of agency; majority shareholder; family manager; performance;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General


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