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The Partisan Politics of Counterterrorism: Reputations, Policy Transparency, and Electoral Outcomes

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  • Di Lonardo, Livio

Abstract

The prevention of terrorist attacks is an important concern for many governments. In democracies, officials also fear the electoral consequences of successful attacks. As a result, counterterrorism policy-making and electoral concerns are tightly intertwined. To understand the implications of this link, I develop a game-theoretic model and show that left-wing incumbents respond to terror threats more aggressively than their right-wing counterparts in order to convince voters that they can be trusted in fighting terrorism. Terrorist attacks improve right-wing incumbents’ reputation, while they worsen the reputation of left-wing incumbents. When the terrorist threat is high, voters ignore right-wing incumbents’ reputation, reelecting them independently of their performance. Finally, I consider the strategic consequences of maintaining counterterrorism policies hidden from the public eye.

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  • Di Lonardo, Livio, 2019. "The Partisan Politics of Counterterrorism: Reputations, Policy Transparency, and Electoral Outcomes," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 253-269, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:pscirm:v:7:y:2019:i:02:p:253-269_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Haritz Garro, 2019. "Terrorism prevention with reelection concerns and valence competition," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 330-369, July.

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