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A Political Economy of Income Tax Policies

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  • Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce
  • Downs, George
  • Smith, Alastair

Abstract

Despite the close ties between tax-generated revenue and government policies, little is known about how political institutions shape the structure of tax choices across income levels. We propose and test a model based on the selectorate perspective, which predicts that leader choices regarding taxing and spending are driven by their desire to maximize their survival prospects against domestic challengers. The empirical tests investigate the conditions under which income taxes are non-existent, flat, more regressive or more progressive, and the degree of heterogeneity in tax systems as a function of governance institutions. The empirical results strongly and robustly support the theoretical predictions while also shedding light on how tax structures implemented in large coalition systems reduce income inequality.

Suggested Citation

  • Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce & Downs, George & Smith, Alastair, 2017. "A Political Economy of Income Tax Policies," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1-29, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:pscirm:v:5:y:2017:i:01:p:1-29_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Tobignaré Yabré & Gervasio Semedo, 2021. "Political stability and fiscal consolidation in sub‐Saharan African countries," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(4), pages 1077-1109, April.
    2. M Socorro Puy, 2019. "Incentives for progressive income taxation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(1), pages 66-102, January.

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