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Legislative Productivity of the U.S. Congress, 1789–2004

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  • Grant, J. Tobin
  • Kelly, Nathan J.

Abstract

We measure legislative productivity for the entire history of the U.S. Congress. Current measures of legislative productivity are problematic because they measure productivity for a limited number of decades and because they are based on different aspects of productivity. We provide a methodology for measuring (1) a Legislative Productivity Index (LPI) and (2) a Major Legislation Index (MLI). We use the W-CALC algorithm of Stimson (1999, Public opinion in America: Moods, cycles, and swings. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press) to combine information from previously used indicators of productivity into measures of the LPI and the MLI. We provide examinations of content, convergent, and construct validity. The construct validity model includes potential determinants of legislative productivity. We conclude that the LPI and the MLI are superior measures of productivity than other measures used in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Grant, J. Tobin & Kelly, Nathan J., 2008. "Legislative Productivity of the U.S. Congress, 1789–2004," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(3), pages 303-323, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:polals:v:16:y:2008:i:03:p:303-323_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Acciai, Claudia, 2021. "The politics of research and innovation: Understanding instrument choices in complex governance environments – the case of France and Italy," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(9).
    2. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2013. "Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 45-76, February.

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