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Pseudocontingencies: Flexible contingency inferences from base rates

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  • Vogel, Tobias
  • Ingendahl, Moritz
  • McCaughey, Linda

Abstract

Humans are evidently able to learn contingencies from the co-occurrence of cues and outcomes. But how do humans judge contingencies when observations of cue and outcome are learned on different occasions? The pseudocontingency framework proposes that humans rely on base-rate correlations across contexts, that is, whether outcome base rates increase or decrease with cue base rates. Here, we elaborate on an alternative mechanism for pseudocontingencies that exploits base rate information within contexts. In two experiments, cue and outcome base rates varied across four contexts, but the correlation by base rates was kept constant at zero. In some contexts, cue and outcome base rates were aligned (e.g., cue and outcome base rates were both high). In other contexts, cue and outcome base rates were misaligned (e.g., cue base rate was high, but outcome base rate was low). Judged contingencies were more positive for contexts in which cue and outcome base rates were aligned than in contexts in which cue and outcome base rates were misaligned. Our findings indicate that people use the alignment of base rates to infer contingencies conditional on the context. As such, they lend support to the pseudocontingency framework, which predicts that decision makers rely on base rates to approximate contingencies. However, they challenge previous conceptions of pseudocontingencies as a uniform inference from correlated base rates. Instead, they suggest that people possess a repertoire of multiple contingency inferences that differ with regard to informational requirements and areas of applicability.

Suggested Citation

  • Vogel, Tobias & Ingendahl, Moritz & McCaughey, Linda, 2022. "Pseudocontingencies: Flexible contingency inferences from base rates," Judgment and Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 400-424, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:judgdm:v:17:y:2022:i:2:p:400-424_8
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