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How self-interest and symbolic politics shape the effectiveness of compensation for nearby housing development

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  • Hankinson, Michael
  • de Benedictis-Kessner, Justin

Abstract

Policy with concentrated costs often faces intense localized opposition. Both private and governmental actors frequently use financial compensation to attempt to overcome this opposition. We measure how effective such compensation is for winning policy support in the arena of housing development. We build a novel survey platform that shows respondents images of their self-reported neighborhood with hypothetical renderings of new housing superimposed on existing structures. Using a sample of nearly 600 Bostonians, we find that compensating residents increases their support for nearby market-rate housing construction. However, compensation does not influence support for affordable housing. We theorize that the inclusion of affordable housing activates symbolic attitudes, decreasing the importance of financial self-interest and thus the effectiveness of compensation. Our findings suggest greater interaction between self-interest and symbolic politics within policy design than previously asserted. Together, this research signals opportunities for coalition building by policy entrepreneurs when facing opposition due to concentrated costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Hankinson, Michael & de Benedictis-Kessner, Justin, 2024. "How self-interest and symbolic politics shape the effectiveness of compensation for nearby housing development," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(4), pages 785-808, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jnlpup:v:44:y:2024:i:4:p:785-808_6
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