Political Competition and Unequal Social Rights

Major social reforms affect the extent to which social rights are granted widely and equally or selectively and in a manner re-enforcing social stratification. Thus, they affect the amount of institutionally sanctioned inequality in a welfare state. This paper seeks to explain the politics of making decisions about unequal social rights. It emphasizes the importance of studying the substantive contents of the policy changes that are on the reform agenda; the kind of actors involved in reform controversies; and the kind of demands they raise. Which actors involved prevail in these controversies, however, is a function of the dynamic of political competition at the time of legislative decision-making. That dynamic tends to be centrifugal; it empowers groups at strategic positions in the political constellation. The paper develops analytical categories for capturing both typological distinctions of substantive policy contents and the empowering dynamic. It demonstrates the significance of this model by analyzing four instances of major welfare reform in Germany.