IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jnlpup/v23y2003i01p1-21_00.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why Does the World Trade Organization Appear Neoliberal? The Puzzle of the High Incidence of Guilty Verdicts in WTO Adjudication

Author

Listed:
  • Iida, Keisuke

Abstract

The dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization tends to give verdicts for the plaintiff much more often than verdicts for the defendant. Simple logic suggests that this is a puzzle: it is not immediately obvious why defendants do not settle out of court if they are likely to be found guilty. I argue that there are three alternative explanations for this puzzle: imperfect enforcement, asymmetric information, and domestic constraints. By examining three major WTO cases, I find the domestic constraints explanation the most persuasive.

Suggested Citation

  • Iida, Keisuke, 2003. "Why Does the World Trade Organization Appear Neoliberal? The Puzzle of the High Incidence of Guilty Verdicts in WTO Adjudication," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(1), pages 1-21, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jnlpup:v:23:y:2003:i:01:p:1-21_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0143814X03003015/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:jnlpup:v:23:y:2003:i:01:p:1-21_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/pup .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.