IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jfinqa/v57y2022i7p2766-2797_9.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

CEO Marketability, Employment Opportunities, and Compensation: Evidence from Compensation Peer Citations

Author

Listed:
  • Choi, Daewoung
  • Cicero, David
  • Mobbs, Shawn

Abstract

Mandatory disclosure of CEO compensation peers signals potential outside opportunities for the cited CEOs by revealing which companies view them as viable executive candidates. CEOs cited often as compensation peers (especially by larger firms, which represent attractive employment opportunities) are more likely to leave for better positions or receive compensation increases. Equity-based awards following cites by larger firms have shorter vesting periods, suggesting these CEOs gain negotiating power relative to their boards. The disclosure requirement enhanced labor market transparency and led to higher compensation for highly cited CEOs without penalizing less cited CEOs, putting upward pressure on CEO compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Choi, Daewoung & Cicero, David & Mobbs, Shawn, 2022. "CEO Marketability, Employment Opportunities, and Compensation: Evidence from Compensation Peer Citations," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(7), pages 2766-2797, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:57:y:2022:i:7:p:2766-2797_9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0022109022000382/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:57:y:2022:i:7:p:2766-2797_9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/jfq .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.