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Necessary Conditions for Aggregation in Securities Markets

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  • Brennan, M. J.
  • Kraus, Alan

Abstract

An important aggregation problem is the derivation of equilibrium security prices which are independent of the allocation of initial wealth among investors. The problem is of interest because, if investors are conceived as being endowed with initial holdings of securities, it is clear that the initial wealth allocation which depends on security prices is endogenous to the model. Although he addresses a differently defined objective, Rubinstein [8] has shown that sufficient conditions for the solution of the problem described above are conditions that permit construction of “composite” (representative) investors whose resources, beliefs, and tastes depend on the exogenous specifications of the economy (viz., the beliefs and tastes of all investors and production conditions) but not on the initial allocation of securities.

Suggested Citation

  • Brennan, M. J. & Kraus, Alan, 1978. "Necessary Conditions for Aggregation in Securities Markets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 407-418, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:13:y:1978:i:03:p:407-418_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Martin S. Eichenbaum & Lars Peter Hansen & Kenneth J. Singleton, 1988. "A Time Series Analysis of Representative Agent Models of Consumption and Leisure Choice Under Uncertainty," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 51-78.
    2. Barlo, Mehmet & Özdog˜an, Ayça, 2014. "Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 46-52.
    3. DeMarzo, Peter & Skiadas, Costis, 1998. "Aggregation, Determinacy, and Informational Efficiency for a Class of Economies with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 123-152, May.
    4. Fischer, Marcel & Jensen, Bjarne Astrup, 2019. "The debt tax shield in general equilibrium," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 151-166.
    5. Kraus, Alan & Smith, Maxwell, 1998. "Endogenous sunspots, pseudo-bubbles, and beliefs about beliefs," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 151-174, August.
    6. H. Henry Cao & Hui Ou-Yang, 2009. "Differences of Opinion of Public Information and Speculative Trading in Stocks and Options," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 299-335, January.
    7. Fischer, Marcel & Jensen, Bjarne Astrup, 2024. "The tax shield increases the interest rate," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    8. Marc Rapp & Bernhard Schwetzler, "undated". "Asset Prices in the Presence of a Tax Authority," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1167, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    9. Rapp, Marc Steffen & Schwetzler, Bernhard, 2008. "Equilibrium security prices with capital income taxes and an exogenous interest rate," CEFS Working Paper Series 2008-08, Technische Universität München (TUM), Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS).
    10. Gomez, Juan-Pedro, 2007. "The impact of keeping up with the Joneses behavior on asset prices and portfolio choice," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 95-103, June.
    11. Edward E. Schlee, 2001. "The Value of Information in Efficient Risk-Sharing Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 509-524, June.

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