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Retaliation, Bargaining, and the Pursuit of “Free and Fair” Trade


  • Gawande, Kishore
  • Hansen, Wendy L.


That domestic political economic factors are important determinants of a nation's trade barriers has been empirically well established. However, the question of how effective strategically retaliatory trade barriers are in deterring foreign protectionism has received far less systematic empirical attention. In this article we use bilateral nontariff barrier (NTB) data between the United States and five developed partner countries (Japan, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom) to systematically examine the effectiveness of strategic retaliation. We employ a simultaneous Tobit model where the home and foreign NTB levels are determined endogenously in a bilateral game. The model provides estimates of deterrence coefficients, that is, the reduction in foreign trade barriers as a result of U.S. retaliation, which we use to characterize the nature of bilateral NTB games. Our hope is that the empirical results presented here, which have realistic though controversial implications, will inform U.S. trade policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Gawande, Kishore & Hansen, Wendy L., 1999. "Retaliation, Bargaining, and the Pursuit of “Free and Fair” Trade," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(01), pages 117-159, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:53:y:1999:i:01:p:117-159_44

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    Cited by:

    1. Kishore Gawande & Hui Li, 2006. "Trade Barriers as Bargaining Outcomes," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 437-457, April.

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