IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/intorg/v24y1970i01p31-47_01.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Un v. Ibrd: A Dilemma of Functionalism

Author

Listed:
  • Bleicher, Samuel A.

Abstract

In its efforts to penalize Portugal and the Republic of South Africa for their colonial and apartheid policies the General Assembly has called upon the specialized agencies to deny to those states the benefits of membership in their respective organizations. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) has refused to do so on the ground that it is a nonpolitical, functional organization without authority to impose sanctions upon members for conduct unrelated to its purposes. The pointed exchange of views between the United Nations and die World Bank on this question illustrates the serious problem of the proper relationship between the United Nations and the specialized agencies and exposes one of the difficulties of the functionalist strategy for world order. An appreciation of the significance of this dispute requires an examination of its history, the legal context in which it arises, and its relationship to the theory of functionalism.

Suggested Citation

  • Bleicher, Samuel A., 1970. "Un v. Ibrd: A Dilemma of Functionalism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 31-47, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:24:y:1970:i:01:p:31-47_01
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0020818300017380/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:24:y:1970:i:01:p:31-47_01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/ino .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.