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Trade sanctions and green trade liberalization




This paper studies the impact of a World Trade Organization withdrawal of trade concessions against countries that fail to respect globally recognized environmental standards. We show that a punishing tariff can be effective when environmental and trade policies are endogenous. When required standards are not too stringent with respect to the marginal damage of pollution, compliance along with free trade as a reward is the unique equilibrium outcome. A positive optimal tariff in the case of non-compliance prevents complete relocation to pollution havens, but only works as a successful credible threat and does not emerge in equilibrium.

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  • Naghavi, Alireza, 2010. "Trade sanctions and green trade liberalization," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(04), pages 379-394, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:15:y:2010:i:04:p:379-394_00

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. J. Peter Neary, 2004. "Europe on the Road to Doha: Towards a New Global Trade Round?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 50(2), pages 319-332.
    2. Markusen James R. & Morey Edward R. & Olewiler Nancy D., 1993. "Environmental Policy when Market Structure and Plant Locations Are Endogenous," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 69-86, January.
    3. Javorcik Beata Smarzynska & Wei Shang-Jin, 2003. "Pollution Havens and Foreign Direct Investment: Dirty Secret or Popular Myth?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 1-34, December.
    4. Jean-Marie Grether & Jaime de Melo, 2003. "Globalization and Dirty Industries: Do Pollution Havens Matter?," NBER Working Papers 9776, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Barrett, Scott, 1997. "The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 345-361, November.
    6. Hoel, Michael, 1997. " Environmental Policy with Endogenous Plant Locations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(2), pages 241-259, June.
    7. Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo & Riezman, Raymond, 2008. "Is partial tax harmonization desirable," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 254-267, February.
    8. Eskeland, Gunnar S. & Harrison, Ann E., 2003. "Moving to greener pastures? Multinationals and the pollution haven hypothesis," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 1-23, February.
    9. Ulph, Alistair & Valentini, Laura, 2001. " Is Environmental Dumping Greater When Plants Are Footloose?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(4), pages 673-688, December.
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    1. repec:spr:ieaple:v:17:y:2017:i:6:d:10.1007_s10784-017-9373-x is not listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy


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