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On The Interpretation Of Decision Theory

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  • Okasha, Samir

Abstract

This paper explores the contrast between mentalistic and behaviouristic interpretations of decision theory. The former regards credences and utilities as psychologically real, while the latter regards them as mere representations of an agent's preferences. Philosophers typically adopt the former interpretation, economists the latter. It is argued that the mentalistic interpretation is preferable if our aim is to use decision theory for descriptive purposes, but if our aim is normative then the behaviouristic interpretation cannot be dispensed with.

Suggested Citation

  • Okasha, Samir, 2016. "On The Interpretation Of Decision Theory," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 409-433, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:32:y:2016:i:03:p:409-433_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Moscati, Ivan, 2021. "On the recent philosophy of decision theory," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115039, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Francesco GUALA, 2017. "Preferences: Neither Behavioural nor Mental," Departmental Working Papers 2017-05, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    3. Ivan Moscati, 2022. "Behavioral and heuristic models are as-if models too — and that’s ok," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 22177, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    4. Gawlik, Remigiusz, 2018. "Decision-making under environmental uncertainty," MPRA Paper 93361, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Vaios Koliofotis, 2021. "Applying evolutionary methods in economics: progress or pitfall?," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 203-223, July.

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