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The discreet charm of the oligarchy: conceptualizing material power and opportunity hoarding

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  • Bogliaccini, Juan A.
  • Madariaga, Aldo

Abstract

Stark wealth inequality is consequential for politics, yet the underlying mechanisms are still understudied. We join recent research urging a deeper analysis of how oligarchic interests and material power operate in highly unequal societies by expanding the business power literature to understand new sources of influence based on wealth. We engage in a concept-building exercise for the concept of business power and clarify the similarities and differences between material power and other sources of business power. We then discuss different mechanisms underlying material power and develop the mechanism of opportunity hoarding from the literature on social closure. Opportunity hoarding helps understand how oligarchic interests appropriate well-functioning state institutions for their benefit. We illustrate these mechanisms by analyzing the case of Guatemala, a country with tremendous wealth inequality and pervasive political instability. We highlight the usefulness of our proposed concept structure for analyzing diverse instances of business power and the concept of material power for understanding business influence in highly unequal societies.

Suggested Citation

  • Bogliaccini, Juan A. & Madariaga, Aldo, 2024. "The discreet charm of the oligarchy: conceptualizing material power and opportunity hoarding," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(4), pages 684-705, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:buspol:v:26:y:2024:i:4:p:684-705_12
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