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The Failure of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council Experiment, 1934–1940

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  • Adamson, Michael R.

Abstract

This article explores the contentious U.S. State Department–Foreign Bondholders Protective Council relationship in the context of interwar foreign economic policy and bureaucratic competition. U.S. officials created the council in 1933 to represent the interests of U.S. investors in the settlement of the numerous dollar bond issues that had gone into default. The article shows why the council failed to perform as U.S. officials expected and outlines the process by which they increasingly interposed themselves in debt negotiations. In doing so, it considers the limitations of using private organizations to accomplish the objectives of public policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Adamson, Michael R., 2002. "The Failure of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council Experiment, 1934–1940," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 479-514, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:buhirw:v:76:y:2002:i:03:p:479-514_07
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    Cited by:

    1. Neal, Larry & White, Eugene N., 2012. "The Glass–Steagall Act in historical perspective," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 104-113.
    2. Juan Flores Zendejas & Pierre Pénet & Christian Suter, 2021. "The Revenge of Defaulters. Sovereign Defaults and Interstate Negotiations in the Post-War Financial Order, 1940–65," Post-Print hal-03352783, HAL.
    3. Flandreau, Marc, 2017. "Reputation, Regulation and the Collapse of International Capital Markets, 1920-1935," CEPR Discussion Papers 11747, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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