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Party System Institutionalization, Accountability and Governmental Corruption

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  • Schleiter, Petra
  • Voznaya, Alisa

Abstract

Why do repeated elections often fail to curb governmental corruption, even in full democracies? While much of the comparative literature on corruption focuses on the institutional features of democracies, this article argues that party system institutionalization is an additional and neglected factor in explaining why corruption may persist in the context of democratic elections. Under-institutionalized party systems impede accountability. They compromise the capacity of voters to attribute responsibility and undermine electoral co-ordination to punish incumbents for corruption. These expectations are tested by combining a controlled comparative study of eighty democracies around the world with an examination of the causal process in a case study of Panama. The findings suggest that party system institutionalization powerfully shapes the scope for governmental corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Schleiter, Petra & Voznaya, Alisa, 2018. "Party System Institutionalization, Accountability and Governmental Corruption," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 315-342, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:48:y:2018:i:02:p:315-342_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Mihály Fazekas & Romain Ferrali & Johannes Wachs, 2023. "Agency Independence, Campaign Contributions, and Favoritism in US Federal Government Contracting," Post-Print hal-03994320, HAL.

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