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Legislative Activity and Gridlock in the European Union

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  • Crombez, Christophe
  • Hix, Simon

Abstract

This article develops a game-theoretical model of European Union (EU) policy making that suggests that the amount of legislative activity depends on the size of the gridlock interval. This is consistent with Krehbiel's study of US politics. This interval depends on two factors: (1) the preference configuration of the political actors and (2) the legislative procedures used in a particular period. Actors’ preferences and procedures are not expected to have any effect beyond their impact on the gridlock interval. The study predicts smaller gridlock intervals, and thus more legislative activity, under the co-decision (consultation) procedure when the pivotal member states and the European Parliament (Commission) are closer to each other. More activity is expected under qualified majority voting in the Council than under unanimity. The results find support for these propositions in an empirical analysis of EU legislative activity between 1979 and 2009.

Suggested Citation

  • Crombez, Christophe & Hix, Simon, 2015. "Legislative Activity and Gridlock in the European Union," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(3), pages 477-499, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:45:y:2015:i:03:p:477-499_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe van Gruisen, 2019. "The Trio Presidency and the Efficiency of Council Decision‐Making: An Empirical Study," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 692-709, July.
    2. Christopher J Williams & Shaun Bevan, 2019. "The effect of public attitudes toward the European Union on European Commission policy activity," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(4), pages 608-628, December.
    3. Thomas König & Bernd Luig, 2017. "The impact of EU decision-making on national parties’ attitudes towards European integration," European Union Politics, , vol. 18(3), pages 362-381, September.
    4. Serra Boranbay-Akan & Thomas König & Moritz Osnabrügge, 2017. "The imperfect agenda-setter: Why do legislative proposals fail in the EU decision-making process?," European Union Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 168-187, June.
    5. Ana Mar Fernández Pasarín & Nuria Font, 2022. "Unveiling Inconsistency: Consensus and Contestation along the Council–Comitology Cycle of EU Policy‐Making," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 427-444, March.
    6. Martin Gross & Marc Debus, 2018. "Gaining new insights by going local: determinants of coalition formation in mixed democratic polities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 61-80, January.
    7. Jørgen Bølstad & James P. Cross, 2016. "Not all Treaties are Created Equal: The Effects of Treaty Changes on Legislative Efficiency in the EU," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 793-808, July.
    8. Daniel Finke, 2020. "At loggerheads over state aid: Why the Commission rejects aid and governments comply," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(3), pages 474-496, September.
    9. Christophe Crombez & Martijn Huysmans & Wim Van Gestel, 2017. "Choosing an informative agenda setter: The appointment of the Commission in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 145-167, June.
    10. Snorre Sylvester Frid-Nielsen, 2018. "Human rights or security? Positions on asylum in European Parliament speeches," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(2), pages 344-362, June.
    11. M. Huysmans, 2018. "Enlargement and Exit:: The Origins of Article 50," Working Papers 18-09, Utrecht School of Economics.
    12. Philippe van Gruisen & Martijn Huysmans, 2020. "The Early Warning System and policymaking in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(3), pages 451-473, September.
    13. Martijn Huysmans, 2019. "Enlargement and exit: The origins of Article 50," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 155-175, June.
    14. Philipp Broniecki, 2020. "Power and transparency in political negotiations," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(1), pages 109-129, March.

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