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Feasible and Continuous Double Implementation of Constrained Walrasian Allocations

Author

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  • Guoqiang Tian

    (Department of Economics, Texas A&M University)

Abstract

This paper provides a simple, feasible, and continuous mechanism whose Nash allocations and strong Nash allocations coincide with constrained Walrasian allocations for pure exchange economies. This mechanism allows not only references and initial endowments but also coalition patterns to be privately observed, a feature missing from much recent work in implementation theory. Unlike most mechanisms proposed in the literature, our mechanism works not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies, and thus it is a unified mechanism which is irrespective of the number of agents. In addition, our implementation result is obtained without modifying individuals' preferences and thus it improves the mechanism proposed in Peleg (1996) without having to define artificial preference relations on price messages announced by individuals.

Suggested Citation

  • Guoqiang Tian, 2000. "Feasible and Continuous Double Implementation of Constrained Walrasian Allocations," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 1(1), pages 19-32, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2000:v:1:i:1:p:19-32
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(2), pages 301-316, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentive mechanism design; Walrasian allocations; Implementation;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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