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La dinámica de la inflación a corto plazo: estimación de una “curva de Phillips neokeynesiana híbrida” para Argentina

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  • Laura D’Amato

    (Banco Central de la República Argentina)

  • Lorena Garegnani

    (Banco Central de la República Argentina)

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Suggested Citation

  • Laura D’Amato & Lorena Garegnani, 2006. "La dinámica de la inflación a corto plazo: estimación de una “curva de Phillips neokeynesiana híbrida” para Argentina," Monetaria, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(4), pages 401-416, octubre-d.
  • Handle: RePEc:cml:moneta:v:xxix:y:2006:i:4:p:401-416
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daniel Heller & Yvan Lengwiler, 1998. "The auctions of Swiss government bonds: should the Treasury price discriminate or not?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Erwann SbaÏ & Olivier Armantier, 2006. "Estimation and comparison of treasury auction formats when bidders are asymmetric," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 745-779.
    3. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
    4. Sara Castellanos, 2001. "Mexican treasury securities primary auctions," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000025, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortaçsu, 2004. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 457-486.
    6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    7. Bresnahan, Timothy F & Greenstein, Shane, 1999. "Technological Competition and the Structure of the Computer Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 1-40, March.
    8. Hansen, Robert G, 1985. "Empirical Testing of Auction Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 156-159.
    9. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1093-1103.
    10. Umlauf, Steven R., 1993. "An empirical study of the Mexican Treasury bill auction," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 313-340, June.
    11. Robert A. Feldman & Vincent Reinhart, 1996. "Auction Format Matters: Evidence on Bidding Behavior and Seller Revenue," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 43(2), pages 395-418, June.
    12. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    13. Marc S. Robinson, 1985. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 141-145.
    14. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2005. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 703-741, August.
    15. Saikat Nandi, 1997. "Treasury auctions: what do the recent models and results tell us?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, pages 4-15.
    16. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1093-1103.
    17. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
    18. Guy Laroque & Bernard Salanie, 2004. "Salaire minimum et emploi en présence de négociations salariales," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, pages 1-22.
    19. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September.
    20. C. Mónica Capra, 1999. "Subastas de títulos públicos en Bolivia," Revista de Análisis del BCB, Banco Central de Bolivia, pages 121-155.
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