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Price undertakings, VERs, and foreign direct investment: the case of foreign rivalry

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  • Jota Ishikawa
  • Kaz Miyagiwa

Abstract

Antidumping (AD) petitions are often withdrawn in favour of voluntary export restraints (VERs) and price undertakings. This paper compares these policy options in the presence of protection-jumping foreign direct investment (FDI), with special emphasis on rivalry between foreign firms. We show that a VER is less likely to induce FDI than a price undertaking or AD. As a result, by settling AD cases with VER agreements, the importing country can pursue a more protectionist policy without triggering FDI. In this sense the GATT ban on VERs following the proliferation of AD uses was a sensible decision.

Suggested Citation

  • Jota Ishikawa & Kaz Miyagiwa, 2008. "Price undertakings, VERs, and foreign direct investment: the case of foreign rivalry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(3), pages 954-970, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:41:y:2008:i:3:p:954-970
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00492.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Mukunoki, Hiroshi, 2021. "Trade liberalization and incentives to implement antidumping protection," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 422-437.
    2. Wu, Shih-Jye & Chang, Yang-Ming & Chen, Hung-Yi, 2014. "Antidumping duties and price undertakings: A welfare analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 97-107.
    3. Ray-Yun Chang & Hong Hwang & Cheng-Hau Peng, 2020. "Antidumping protection and welfare in a differentiated duopoly," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 421-446, July.
    4. Cheng‐Hau Peng & Hong Hwang & Kuo‐Feng Kao, 2023. "Is price undertaking a more friendly protection policy than an anti‐dumping duty?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 120-134, January.
    5. Chang, Yang-Ming & Raza, Mian F., 2023. "Dumping, antidumping duties, and price undertakings," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 131-151.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade

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