The efficiencies defence in merger cases: implications of alternative standards
We compare alternative interpretations of the efficiencies defence, provided under Canadian competition law, for mergers found likely to lessen competition substantially. We find the respective percentage reductions in long-run marginal cost required for a profitable merger to satisfy the total surplus, price, and two weighted surplus standards, given pre-merger market structure. We find that when efficiency spillovers are low and markets are concentrated, the cost reduction required to satisfy the price standard is over four times higher than is required for a profitable, total-surplus-increasing merger and the cost reductions required to satisfy the weighted surplus standards are nearly twice as high.
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Volume (Year): 33 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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