An Equilibrium Analysis of Central Bank Independence and Inflation
A dynamic equilibrium model is constructed to analyze the implications of different degrees of central bank independence. In the main model, agents are permitted to vote on the desired inflation and labor taxes to finance government spending. Multiple perfect-foresight equilibria arise, and one of them exhibits fluctuations in output, investment, and the inflation rates as a result of permitting agents to vote. If, instead of having agents vote each period on these parameters, inflation and labor taxes in the model are set at fixed levels, these fluctuations do not arise, and a lower inflation rate can appear.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 30 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://economics.ca/en/membership.php Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:30:y:1997:i:4:p:943-58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.