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Decentralized Markets and Endogenous Institutions

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  • Michael Peters

Abstract

This paper is concerned with decentralized models of market equilibrium in which the primary interest lies in the nature of the institutions that govern trade. There are two separate branches in this literature. In the first, the institutions that govern trade are taken to be given exogenously. The primary motivation for models in this class is essentially the study of comparative institutions. In particular the papers are interested in whether there are specific institutions that will generate Walrasian prices and allocations approximately when transactions costs are small. In the second branch of the literature, the institutions that govern trade themselves are made endogenous. These models characterize the nature of these endogenously generated institutions and examine their efficiency in environments where transactions costs are small.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Peters, 1995. "Decentralized Markets and Endogenous Institutions," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 227-260, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:28:y:1995:i:2:p:227-60
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    Cited by:

    1. Germano, Fabrizio, 2003. "Bertrand-edgeworth equilibria in finite exchange economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 677-692, July.
    2. Kirchsteiger, G. & Niederle, M. & Potters, J.J.M., 1998. "The Endogenous Evolution of Market Institutions : An Experimental Investigation," Other publications TiSEM 5655ebed-6950-4ab7-b671-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Muriel Niederle & Josef Perktold, 2000. "Market Institutions and Quality Enforcement," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1482, Econometric Society.
    4. Stephen Oluwatobi & Uchenna Efobi & Isaiah Olurinola & Philip Alege, 2015. "Innovation in Africa: Why Institutions Matter," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 83(3), pages 390-410, September.
    5. Nejat Anbarci & Pedro Gomis-Porqueras & Marcus Pivato, 2018. "Evolutionary stability of bargaining and price posting: implications for formal and informal activities," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 365-397, April.
    6. Camera, G. & Delacroix, A., 2001. "Bargaining or Price Posting?," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1147, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    7. James Andreoni & Michael A. Kuhn & Larry Samuelson, 2016. "Starting Small: Endogenous Stakes and Rational Cooperation," NBER Working Papers 21934, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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