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Oligopoles et choix de politique commerciale

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  • Jean-Marc Siroen

Abstract

Dans leurs relations bilaterales, les pays industriels font frequemment usage d'instruments non tarifaires, discriminatoires et tres cibles sur certains secteurs ou certaines entreprises comme les accords d'autolimitation volontaires, les accords d'importations volontaires, les subventions, les droits anti-dumping ou compensateurs. La chronique de ces actions laisse presumer l'existence d'un jeu strategique des Etats, permis, notamment, par la relative concentration des marches.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Marc Siroen, 1999. "Oligopoles et choix de politique commerciale," Economie Internationale, CEPII research center, issue 79, pages 39-62.
  • Handle: RePEc:cii:cepiei:1999-3tb
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    File URL: http://www.cepii.fr/IE/ei.asp?issue=79
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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